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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Office of Congressman Chris Cannon (more accurately titled the Employing
Office of Congressman Chris Cannon, an Employing Office within the U.S. House of
Representatives), a named but unserved Defendant and Appellee in this action, appears
specially by and through its attorneys, Richard M. Hymas of Nielsen & Senior, P.C. and
Frederick M. Herrera of the United States House of Representatives, Office of House
Employment Counsel, and petitions this Court for rehearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
35 for the limited purpose of contesting this Court's apparent assumption of jurisdiction
over the Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon in this action.
I. INTRODUCTION
In referring to the Defendants and Appellees in its written Opinion dated February
17, 2000, the Court did not differentiate those Defendants who had been served with
process, were parties in the court below, and are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court
from those Defendants who had not been served with process, were not parties below,
and are not subject to the Court's jurisdiction. As a result, it appears from the Opinion
that the Court has exercised subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the
Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon. Such an exercise of jurisdiction is
improper for the following reasons:
First, the courts of this State, including the district court and this Court, lack
subject matter jurisdiction over any claim against the Employing Office. Second, this

103650.NI211.001
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Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Employing Office because it was not served
with process and the district court never acquired or purported to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the Employing Office.
The Court's Opinion, if not corrected, will cause confusion below on remand
regarding issues of jurisdiction on matters arising under a federal statute. Moreover, to
allow Plaintiff— who never served the Employing Office — to be able to benefit from a
ruling implicating the federal government, would be unfair, a violation of due process, a
violation of the principle of sovereign immunity, and would thwart the jurisdictional
requirements under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Employing Office respectfully requests that the Court amend its Opinion dated
February 17, 2000, to clarify (1) that the Employing Office was not served in this action
and was not a party to the appeal or the proceeding in the district court; (2) that neither
this Court nor the district court has asserted subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction over the Employing Office; and (3) that the Court's Opinion reversing the
decision of the district court does not apply to, and has no effect upon, the Employing
Office.
IL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about April 16, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against six defendants
alleging, among other things, breach of contract. These six defendants are Chris Cannon,
individually, the Office of Congressman Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc.,
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Cannon Industries, Inc., The CI Group, and Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc.1 Of
the six defendants, only three were served with a Summons and Complaint: Chris
Cannon, individually, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. and Cannon Industries, Inc.2
The Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon has never been served with
a Summons and Complaint and no proof of service for this Defendant is filed in the
district court pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(h).3
In the district court, a motion to dismiss was filed by Mary Anne Q. Wood, the
attorney for Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. and Cannon Industries, Inc,
the three defendants that had been served.4 After a hearing, the district court granted the
motion filed by those defendants but did not clarify which parties were subject to its final
judgment. The Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon did not participate in
the motion to dismiss or any other aspect of the case at the trial court level because it
never was served.5

*First Amended Complaint at 1; Appellate Record [f,R.,f] 373-379; Attachment A
hereto.
2

See Summons for Chris Cannon, Summons for Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc.,
and Summons for Cannon Industries, Inc.; R. 51-59; Attachments B, C and D hereto. See
also Plaintiffs Motion for Stay of Final Judgment, etc. at 1; Plaintiffs Mem. in Support
of Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, etc. at 3; R. 521-528; Attachment E hereto.]
3

See Record Index, Attachment F hereto.

defendants' Mem. in Support of Motion to Dismiss at n.l; R. 138-149;
Attachment G hereto.
Attachment E and Attachment G.
103650.NI211.001
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On February 9, 1999, Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of her Complaint
to this Court and served her Notice of Appeal on Mary Anne Q. Wood, the attorney who
had fully participated at the trial court level and responded to the appeal solely for the
three served Defendants.6 Plaintiff also served her Notice of Appeal on Michael Patrick
O'Brien, the attorney for the Salt Lake Tribune J The Employing Office was not served
with the Notice of Appeal and did not participate in the appeal.
On February 17, 2000, this Court issued its Opinion reversing the trial court's
order granting the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the district court.8 The
case caption in the Opinion names the Office of Congressman Chris Cannon as a
Defendant and an Appellee, and references are made throughout the opinion to the
"defendants" and "appellees." Nothing is said in the Opinion, however, to indicate that
the Employing Office had not been served with process, had not been a party in the
proceedings below, and had not participated in the appeal. The Opinion also did not
mention that this Court and the district court had not assumed subject matter jurisdiction
or personal jurisdiction over the Employing Office and that the Opinion did not apply to
the Employing Office.

6

Notice of Appeal, R. 555-559; Attachment H hereto.

Attachment H.
8

A copy of the Opinion dated February 17, 2000, is attached hereto as Attachment

I.
103650.NI211.001

4

The Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon is filing this Petition for
Rehearing to request that the Court amend its Opinion dated February 17, 2000, to clarify
(1) that the Employing Office was not served in this action and was not a party to the
appeal or the proceeding in the district court; (2) that neither this Court nor the district
court has asserted subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the Employing
Office; and (3) that the Court's Opinion reversing the decision of the district court does
not apply to, and has no effect upon, the Employing Office.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

THE STATE COURTS OF UTAH LACK SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER THE EMPLOYING OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON PURSUANT TO U.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT.
1.

Sovereign Immunity has not been waived by Congress.

The Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over any action or other
matter involving the federal government absent an express waiver to the contrary. For
actions taken in his official capacity, Congressman Chris Cannon and his congressional
office are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S.
57, 58 (1963) ("[r]elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign
if the decree would operate against the latter").
It is well established that "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit
save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941);
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see also United States v. Dalim, 494
103650.NI211.001
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U.S. 596, 608 (1990); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). A court's
"jurisdiction to grant relief depends wholly upon the extent to which the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity to suit and . . . such a waiver cannot be implied but must
be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) ("King"); see
also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981). The Supreme Court has stated
that "a critical requirement firmly grounded in [its] precedents" is that" waiver of the
Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory
t e x t . . . and will not be implied." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations
omitted).
Sovereign immunity applies to the legislative branch of the United States
government. See Keener v. Congress of the United States, 467 F.2d 952, 953 (5th Cir.
1972)(Congress is protected from suit by sovereign immunity). For purposes of
employment matters, the legislative branch has waived sovereign immunity only in
accordance with the provisions of the Congressional Accountability Act ("CAA"). See 2
U.S.C. § 1301-1438. The terms of such limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the
CAA establish the parameters of a court's subject matter jurisdiction over CAA cases.
In 1997, Plaintiff brought allegations of sexual harassment against the Employing
Office of Congressman Chris Cannon. Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App. 1-2, <p
[Attachment I]. In 1998, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement resolving
any factual and legal allegations relating to any and all claims and disputes between them.

103650 NI211001
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Id. at Z.
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Plaintiff incorrectly cites in her Complaint that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-3-4. [R. 1-9.] That provision cannot vest the trial court with

jurisdiction over a federal government legislative entity and, therefore, does not extend
jurisdiction to this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assertion of jurisdiction is incorrect
and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Employing Office.
2.

The Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over an
employing office in the legislative branch of federal government where
exclusive jurisdiction has been granted to the Office of Compliance in
accordance with the Congressional Accountability Act.

The linchpin of the statutory framework of the Congressional Accountability Act
["CAA"] is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity with the bestowment of subject
matter jurisdiction in tribunals other than the Utah state court system.9
The CAA applies to "covered employees" of the legislative branch, including
applicants and former employees of the personal office of a Member of the House of
Representatives. 2 U.S.C. § 1301(9)(A).10 The Employing Office of Congressman Chris
Cannon, named as a defendant in this action, is an independent entity specifically
recognized as the statutory employing office by the CAA. 2 U.S.C. § 1301(9)(D).

9

Under the CAA, the federal Office of Compliance has sole jurisdiction to
entertain questions arising under the settlement agreement as they relate to the Employing
Office of Congressman Chris Cannon because the CAA established statutory enforcement
procedures directing the Executive Director of the Office of Compliance to act pursuant
to section 414 of the CAA.
10

Section 101(9)(A) defines "employing office" as the personal office of a
Member of the House of Representatives or of a Senate. 2 U.S.C. § 1301(9)(A).
103650 NI211.001
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to section 414 of the Congressional Accountability Act and that provision became
effective when it was approved by the Office of Compliance Executive Director. 2
U.S.C. § 1414.11 Thus, pursuant to section 410 of the CAA, "except as expressly
authorized by sections 407, 408, and 409, the compliance or noncompliance with the
provisions of this Act and any action taken pursuant to this Act shall not be subject to
judicial reviewr 2 U.S.C. § 1410.12 (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, neither the Third Judicial District Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over the Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon in this action.
Congress has not provided a jurisdictional basis in which to pursue a case in Utah's state
courts for a case involving a congressional employing office. Moreover, the legislative
branch of the federal government has consented to a limited waiver of its sovereign
immunity in federal courts only. Thus, sovereign immunity is a bar to the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court absent an "unequivocally expressed" waiver of that immunity.
King, 395 U.S. at 4. There has been no such waiver here.

11

2 U.S.C. 1414 provides that "[a]ny settlement entered into by the parties to a
process described in section 210, 215, 220, or 401 shall be in writing and not become
effective unless it is approved by the Executive Director." The Office of Compliance also
addresses formal Settlement Agreements in section 9.05(b) of their Procedural Rules.
That section states that "the parties may agree formally to settle all or part of a disputed
matter in accordance with section 414 of the Act. In that event, the agreement shall be in
writing and submitted to the Executive Director for review and approval." Office of
Compliance Procedural Rule § 9.05(b). See Attachment J.
12

The jurisdictional review enumerated in sections 407, 408 and 409 are
extremely limited and only grant review in the federal court system.
103650.NI211.001
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FHE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS LACKS PERSONAL J URISDll '" N
OVER THE EMPLOYING OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN CHRIS
CANNON BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO EFFECT SUFFICIENT
SERVICE OF PROCESS.
m

Utah Court of Appeals lacks personal jurisdiction over the i mpiov iug
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897 (I Jtah 1975) (defendant has ° re:*** ft" ippear specially and raise point ol detective
servi
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wiii^n she cannot do. i n'st, there is no provision within the Utah Rules of Civil
<, .lure that provide for effectuating'service of process on a legislative federal
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lie Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service of
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- r or agency of the I Jnited States by serving the
v
United States and ! - aiding a cop> of the summons and of the complaint by regw;
or certified mail to such officer or agency." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(5) (emphasis addeay,
see also Kaiser v. Miller, 115 F.R.D, 504 (D.D.C. 1987) (service of process on Capitol
Police Officer must be made by personally serving the officer or the agenc)r)
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Second, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she complied with the proof of service
requirements under Rule 4(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff named the
Employing Office as a defendant in her Complaint. That defendant, however, has never
been served with a summons and a Complaint.14 Pursuant to Rule 4(h) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, "the party serving the process shall file proof of service with the court
promptly, and in any event within the time during which the person served must respond
to the process, and proof of service must be made within ten days after such service."
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(h). To date, no proof of service has been filed reflecting that the
Employing Office has been served, and none, in fact, exists.
Without having acquired personal jurisdiction over the Employing Office, this
Court appears to have improperly issued a decision against the Employing Office.
"Effective service is, of course, the keystone to a court's personal jurisdiction over the
defendant..." Garden Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 238 F.2d 651 (1 st Cir. 1956), citing
Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437(1910) and General Investment
Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922). If Plaintiff is to
perfect her service of process, she must properly serve the Employing Office in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the first instance so that the
Employing Office can assert jurisdictional arguments at the district court level. Not
properly serving the Employing Office prejudices the rights of this entity and establishes

14

See Attachments B, C, and D.

103650.NI211.001

12

a precedent mi O I I M S I I mil IUIIIII 11 it I ' U N L M L S M O I W I I A t M I I IIII il ii I i mi I m II"',
11ns t . n l n l

*

,-

-

«

a s w e ii a s

il h i u i i i v t Iliiiiiililll

the district court below;

lacks personal j j i ^ u i u i j ; . over the Employing Office.
Plaintiff cannot plead ignorance in failing to serve tin. I mpioying Office

\s

reflectetl in (In pionl nul sn m t Iliiiiiililll IIII.IKR1 (I ^ponlm I'IIMH • In ^/n v llinr ilclnidiinls
and not the others.13 Moreover, Plaintiff chose to serve courtesy copies of the Notice of
Appeal on the attorney representing the Salt Lake Tribune, but noi *•?•- ;t s attorneys
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counsel for the Employing Office participated in the Office of

Compliance process separate and apart from the other named defendants. Plaintiffs
counsel knew and understood that separate counsel was designated for the Emploj liig
Office
i \ . CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Employing Office of Congressman Chris Cannon
resptvlllhiilh iieqticsls llial 11 it I 'mill iiin nil ill I )pmi n Iiii d 1 i IHIUI'I I ' 'llllll I

huh

(1) that the Employing Office was not served in this action and was not a party to the
appeal or the proceeding in the district court; (2) that neither this Court: nor the district

1

lt

See Attachments B, C and D.

See AiLu

court has asserted subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the Employing
Office; and (3) that the Court's Opinion reversing the decision of the district court does
not apply to, and has no effect upon, the Employing Office.
DATED this

day of March, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,

Richard M. Hymas
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Frederick M. Herrera
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OFFICE OF EMPLOYMENT COUNSEL
Attorneys for the Employing Office of
Congressman Chris Cannon
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CER1 'IMC/ATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the

day of March, 2000,1 served two true and correct copies

of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, by causing the same to be mailed, via
first class United States mail, postage prepaid, to thefollowing:
Roger H. Hoole
Heather E. Morrison
Hoole & King, L.C.
4276 South Highland Dri\ e
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Mary Anne Q1
Wood & Crapo
60 East South Temple, ^u..
Salt Lake City, Utah 841II
Attorneys for Chris Cannon. ifiJindualh
Chris Cannon for Congress. //?,
Cannon Industries, Inc.

t^

I I ••

1_>

iW

All

10,3650,,,! 11211.001

Tab A

Roger H. Hoole 5089
Heather E. Morrison 6945
HOOLE & KING, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone No. (801) 277-1989
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRELLEY MACKEY,
Plaintiff,

FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT

vs.
CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON
FOR CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP,
and CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Civil No. 980903909
Defendants.
Judge Homer J. Wilkinson

Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey, hereby complains, alleges and demands of Defendants Chris
Cannon, individually, The Office of Congressman Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon For Congress, Inc.,
Cannon Industries, Inc., The CI Group, Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc., as follows.

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

At all times material hereto, Crelley Mackey ("Ms. Mackey") was a resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

At all times material hereto, Chris Cannon ("Mr. Cannon") was a resident of Utah

County, State of Utah.
3.

At all times material hereto, the Office of Congressman Chris Cannon ("Employing

Office") was an agency or corporation, or organized under an agency or corporation, of the United
States of America.
4.

At all times material hereto, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. (the "Campaign") was

a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
5.

At all times material hereto, Cannon Industries, Inc. was a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
6.

At all times material hereto, The CI Group was a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Utah.
7.

At all times material hereto, Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc. was a

corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah. ("Cannon Industries, Inc.",
"The CI Group", "Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc." are collectively referred to hereinafter
as the "Cannon Entities".)
8.

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4. Venue is

proper in this Court pursuant to and §78-13-4 and §78-13-7.
-2-

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
9.

On or about February 9,1998, Ms. Mackey and the entities associated with Defendant

Chris Cannon entered into an agreement through which they agreed to resolve any factual and legal
allegations relating to claims and disputes between them.
10.

The settlement agreement not only resolved and rendered moot the factual and legal

allegations relating to the parties' claims and disputes, but also prohibited the partiesfromdisclosing
any such factual and legal allegations by the following language:
The Parties agree that the factual and legal allegations relating to their claims
and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement shall be
confidential and that they shall not disclose to any third party that confidential
information . . . except (a) to their attorneys, therapists, tax advisors . . . or as
required by law... (c) to disclose on Monday, February 9,1998 that "Ms. Mackey's
claims . . . have been resolved to the Parties1 satisfaction .. . and (e) thereafter, if
further pressured by the media and asked specifically whether the Cannon
Entities or individuals contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his
representatives may respond (after having spoken with Roger H. Hoole) that
"no Cannon entities or campaign contributed to any settlement." Other than
as specifically allowed herein, the Parties and their attorneys shall not volunteer
any confidential information, and in response to any request for information by
any person or entity shall say only "no comment."1
(emphasis added)
11.

On April 15,1998, Mr. Cannon and certain members of his congressional staff met

with three reporters at the Salt Lake Tribune.

1

This confidentiality clause is one of the provisions of the confidential settlement
agreement which were disclosed by Mr. Cannon and various Cannon Entities in a Motion to Dismiss
filed with this Court on May 7,1998 ("Cannon's Motion to Dismiss").
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12.

During that meeting, Mr. Cannon made a number of voluntary statements and

expressed certain opinions, which statements and opinions comprise "factual and legal allegations
relating to [the parties'] claims and disputes".
13.

By sharing his factual and legal allegations with the Tribune's reporters—on the

record and for the purpose of having them publish his statements and opinions in the Tribune—Mr.
Cannon flagrantly violated the express prohibition of the settlement agreement against a party's postsettlement disclosure of mooted factual and legal allegations.
14.

Mr. Cannon's unwarranted statements and opinions included, but are not limited to

the following—all in violation of the confidential settlement agreement:
A.

That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality;

B.

That they are not holding her to confidentiality;

C.

That although she is free to discuss it, there would be no benefit for her to
talk about it publicly;

15.

D.

That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part;

E.

That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office;

F.

That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations;

G.

That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit; and

H.

That her allegations wouldn't have held up.

Some of the information improperly disclosed to the Tribune appeared the following

day in a Tribune article, and was later reported or discussed in other newspapers and in other media.
-4-

16.

A copy of the Tribunes April 16,1998 article entitled "Cannon Talks on Sex Case"

is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "1".
17.

On information and belief, Mr. Cannon has engaged in further violations of the

settlement agreement and independent tortious conduct toward Ms. Mackey.
18.

At times material hereto, Mr. Cannon acted individually and/or was an authorized

agent, servant or employee acting within the course and scope of his employment or agency, for
which the Employing Office, the Campaign and the Cannon Entities are therefore liable.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
19.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of

this Complaint.
20.

On or about April 15,1998, Mr. Cannon individually, and/or acting on behalf of the

Employing Office, the Campaign and the Cannon Entities, materially breached the settlement
agreement by disclosing confidential information and expressing opinions regarding the same.
21.

On information and belief, Mr. Cannon has engaged in other violations of the

settlement agreement.
22.

Ms. Mackey has been damaged by Mr. Cannon, the Employing Office, the Campaign

and/or the Cannon Entities as a result of this material breach and is entitled to actual and
compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
23.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 22 of

the Complaint.
24.

Mr. Cannon individually, and/or acting on behalf of the Employing Office, the

Campaign and the Cannon Entities, breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
contained in the settlement agreement by vitiating her reasonably expected benefits of the settlement
agreement.
25.

Ms. Mackey has been damaged by Mr. Cannon, the Employing Office, the Campaign

and/or the Cannon Entities as a result of this material breach and is entitled to general and broad
consequential damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, together with attorneys1 fees and costs.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, demanding trial by jury, prays for relief against Mr. Cannon
individually, and/or against the Employing Office, the Campaign and the Cannon Entities as follows:
A.

For special damages for lost wages in an amount not less than $ 10,417.00 and for past

medical expenses in an amount not less than $9,500.00;
B.

For general damages for loss of future earning capacity and future medical expenses

in an amount to be proven at trial;
C.

For additional general and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

D.

For costs and reasonable attorney's fees; and

E.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
/ £>H "A o o a ST
DATED this 3 1 " day of Jwiy, 1998.
HOOLE&KING,L.C.

LLAIL
Roger H( Hoole
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i &•**•
Au^xT
I hereby certify that on the 3 * * day of July, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be served via United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the following:
Mary Anne Q. Wood
WOOD, QUINN & CRAPO
60 Easx South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Sharon E. Sonnenreich
143 South Main Street, 7"' Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Patrick O'Brien
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &. MCDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Ik
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DATE:
;,nr.yilJi
ji.\,

Roger
;r H. Hoole 50J&9
Heather
] MomsonfaM@dl
her E.
HOOLE
• KING,
)LE &
hGS^
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone No. (801) 277-1989

Jk.

l iVj>K
V^*<Z^

TIME:J
PUCE: AS 1E..2M
SERVED BY: ~
SIGNATURE:

"

Zl&aG*
~~

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey

IN THETHIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRELLEY MACKEY,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

VS.

CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON
FOR CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP,
and CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 980903909
Judge Homer Wilkinson

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
CHRIS CANNON FOR CONGRESS, INC.
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt

Lake City, Utah, 84111-1860, and to serve upon or mail to Roger H. Hoole, HOOLE & KING, L.C,
4276 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84124 a copy of said Answer within twenty (20) days
after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereby
annexed and herewith served upon you,
DATED this Jt/%y

of April, 1998.
HOOLE & KING, L.C.

Roger M. Hoole
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Serve Witness At:
Registered Agent:
Stanley R. Dewaal
257 East 200 South #950
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RETURN OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Bodie Riehl, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, depose and say:
1.

I received the hereto annexed Summons and Complaint on April 17,1998 and served

the same upon Stanley Dewaal, registered agent for Chris Cannon for Congress at 257 East, 200
South, Suite 950, on April 17,1998 at approximately 10:30 a.m. by delivering copies of the same
to Stanley Dewaal.
2.

I am a person over the age of twenty-one (21) years and not a party to or otherwise

interested in the lawsuit.
3.

At the time and place of serving the Summons and Complaint, I endorsed the

Summons with my name and the date and time of service.
DATED at Salt Lake County, Utah this 18th day of April, 1998.

-Ma^hlL
Bodie Riehl
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of April, 1998.

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH
My Commission Expires
February 2,2002
TAMARALEABRINGARD
1601 Siggard Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

V^.&A^aM^

JOTARY PUBLIC

TabC

SERVED ON: Z u s K f t t a ^

Roger H. Hoole 5089
Heather E. Morrison 6945
HOOLE & KING, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone No. (801) 277-1989

SERVED BY: 7 W / V ?liU
SIGNATURE: " " '" "
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 2 h 1938
BMJIAKECOCXTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey

VjfSKHf

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRELLEY MACKEY,
SUMMONS

Plaintiff,

CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON
FOR CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP,
and CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Civil No. 980903909
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
CHRIS CANNON
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt

Lake City, Utah, 84111-1860, and to serve upon or mail to Roger H. Hoole, HOOLE & KING, L.C,
4276 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84124 a copy of said Answer within twenty (20) days
after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereby
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this / 4 ^ d a y of April, 1998.
HOOLE & KING, L.C.

ILJl

togerH. Hoole
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Serve Witness At:
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RETURN OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Bodie Riehl, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, depose and say:
1.

I received the hereto annexed Summons and Complaint on April 17,1998 and served

the same upon Russel C. Skousen, attorney for Chris Cannon, at 60 East South Temple, Suite 500,
on April 17,1998 at approximately 3:30 p.m. by delivering copies of the same to Russel C. Skousen.
2.

I am a person over the age of twenty-one (21) years and not a party to or

otherwise interested in the lawsuit.
3.

At the time and place of serving the Summons and Complaint, I endorsed the

Summons with my name and the date and time of service.
DATED at Salt Lake County, Utah this 18th day of April, 1998.

to>.4oJU.
Bodie Riehl
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18m day of April, 1998

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH
My Commission Expires
February 2,2002
TAMARALEABRINGARO
1601 Siggard Drive
Salt Lake City. Utah 84106

A

MA 7fA

NOTAI
OTARY PI

JC

UX^MASJ

A^MSI.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT PATE: (\pfrl fllfflf
SERVED

Third Judicial District
APR 2J.1998
Roger H.Hoole 5089
^
Heather E. Morrison 6945
HOOLE&KING.L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone No. (801) 277-1989

TIME: J J 2 U S
U SERVED BY: 'frrvJi/. j?i*h> t»$£Q&
.SIGNATURE:
^QwLt^A<L

Deputy dork

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRELLEY MACKEY,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

VS.

CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON
FOR CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP,
and CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 980903909
Judge Homer Wilkinson

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
CANNON INDUSTRIES, INC.
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt

Lake City, Utah, 84111-1860, and to serve upon or mail to Roger H. Hoole, HOOLE & KING, L.C,
4276 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84124 a copy of said Answer within twenty (20) days
after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereby
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this J ^ d a y of April, 1998.
HOOLE & KING, L.C.

Roger H. Hoole
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Serve Witness At:
Registered Agent:
J. Nathan Anderson
60 East South Temple, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 841.11
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, Bodie Riehl, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, depose and say:
1.

I received the hereto annexed Summons and Complaint on April 17,1998 and served

the same upon Nathan Anderson, registered agent for Cannon Industries, Inc., at 60 East South
Temple, Suite #2200 on April 17,1998 at approximately 10:15 a.m. by delivering copies of the same
to Nathan Anderson.
2.

I am a person over the age of twenty-one (21) years and not a party to or otherwise

interested in the lawsuit.
3.

At the time and place of serving the Summons and Complaint, I endorsed the

Summons with my name and the date and time of service.
DATED at Salt Lake County, Utah this 18th day of April, 1998.

Bodie Riehl
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of April, 1998.
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Roger H.Hoole 5089
Heather E. Morrison 6945
HOOLE&KING,L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone (801) 277-1989
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRELLEY MACKEY,
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(b)

Plaintiff,

vs.
CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON
FOR CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP,
and CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Civil No. 980903909
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.

Plaintiff, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, and pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civ. P. 54(b) hereby moves this Court for entry of a Final Judgment to clarify that the Order entered
by this Court on January 11,1999 dismissing Plaintiffs claims as to three of the seven Defendants,

-1-

is final as to all of the Defendants. A proposed copy of the Final Judgment is filed concurrently
herewith. This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum and the pleadings on file
herein.
DATED this 25th day of January, 1999.
HOOLE&KING,L.C.

Roger HI Hoole
Attorneys for Plaintiff Crelley Mackey

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^^"^"day of January, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy
the foregoing to be served by hand delivery on the following:
Mary Anne Q. Wood
Sheri A. Mower
WOOD & CRAPO
60 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Patrick O'Brien
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

U/h, _
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Roger H.Hoole 5089
Heather E. Morrison 6945
HOOLE&KING,L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone No. (801) 277-1989

I'JTY

a^M

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Crelley Mackey

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(b)

CRELLEY MACKEY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON
FOR CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP,
and CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Civil No. 980903909
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.

Plaintiff, ("Ms. Mackey") by and through her undersigned counsel of record, hereby submits
the following Memorandum in Support of Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
54(b).
FACTS
1.

On April 16, 1998, Ms. Mackey filed a Complaint against the following seven

Defendants: Chris Cannon, the Office of Congressman Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon For Congress,

Inc., Cannon Industries, Inc., The CI Group, and Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc. (A copy
of the Complaint is on file with the Court.)
2.

On or about May 7,1998, three of those Defendants, Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon

For Congress, Inc., Cannon Industries, Inc., filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Mackey's Complaint.
(A copy of the Motion to Dismiss is on file with the Court.) Specifically, that Motion states, in
relevant part, that "Defendants Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon For Congress, Inc., Cannon Industries,
Inc

seek dismissal of the complaint filed by Crelley Mackey." (Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

at page 1.)
3.

On December 15,1998, the Court granted Defendants Chris Cannon's, Chris Cannon

For Congress, Inc.'s, Cannon Industries, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss. The Court's ruling was reduced
to an Order on or about January 11,1999.
4.

To clarify whether the Court's January 11,1999 Order, which disposes of the claims

against some but not all of the Defendants, constitutes afinaljudgment for purposes of an appeal,
counsel for Ms. Mackey sent a letter with a copy of a proposed Final Judgment to defense counsel
for her approval as to form. (See a copy of the letter and proposed Final Judgment from Roger H.
Hoole to Mary Anne Wood dated January 20,1999, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A".)
5.

On January 21,1999, defense counsel sent Ms. Mackey's counsel a letter in which

she stated that she was unwilling to sign the proposed Final Judgment. (See a copy of the letter from
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Mary Anne Wood dated January 21,1999, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".)
ARGUMENT
The Complaint and Amended Complaint in this Action was brought by Ms. Mackey against
seven Defendants, only three of whom moved this Court for dismissal. Ms. Mackey's claims as to
the other four Defendants remain.1 Therefore, because the January 11,1999 Order adjudicated the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the seven Defendants, it is technically not final under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for purposes of an appeal.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states in pertinent part:
[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the... parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all o f . . . the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties ...".
(emphasis added.) The Rule is very clear: absent the Court's express finding that there is no just
reason for delay and its express direction for the entry of judgment, an Order involving fewer than
all of the parties, such as the January 11 * Order in this case, is not final. All that Ms. Mackey seeks

1

Defense counsel asserts in her January 21 letter that the Court's Order is in fact final
because Ms. Mackey did not serve all of the Defendants prior to the case's dismissal. However,
although not served, the remaining Defendants are still "parties" to the lawsuit. Accord Restatement
(2nd) of Judgments § 34(1) (defining "party" to an action as "[a] person who is named as a party to
an action and subjected to the jurisdiction of the court"); State in Interest of T.J.. 945 P.2d 158,165
(Utah App. 1997). Technically, Ms. Mackey could still pursue her claims against the remaining
Defendants, even if that required the filing of a new complaint.
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here is a clarification that the Order is final as to all of the Defendants so that she may pursue her
appeal without being barred by Rule 54(b)'s requirement of finality. See, e ^ A.J. Mackav Co. v.
Okland Constr. Co.. 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991) (appeal of an order that was not final and neither
certified nor eligible for certification under Rule 54(b) was not properly taken, and the remedy was
dismissal of the appeal.)
CONCLUSION
Because Ms. Mackey's case involved seven Defendants, the rights of only three of whom
have been adjudicated, the Order entered by this Court on January 11,1999 is not technically final.
Ms. Mackey asks that this Court enter a Final Judgment, a proposed copy of which is filed
concurrently herewith, in order to clarify that the January 11 Order is in fact final as to all of the
Defendants.
DATED this 25th day of January, 1999.
HOOLE&KING,L.C.

Roger H. Hbole
Attorneys for Plaintiff Crelley Mackey
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of January, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be served by hand delivery on the following:
Mary Anne Q. Wood
Sheri A. Mower
WOOD&CRAPO
60 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Patrick O'Brien
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

R l^-
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CRELLEYMACKEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS
CHRIS CANNON, ET AL
Defendants-Appellees.
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Attorneys for Defendants1
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CRELLEYMACKEY,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
CHRIS CANNON, Individually, THE
OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN CHRIS
CANNON, CHRIS CANNON FOR
CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP, and
CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Civil No. 9809039Q$f
Judge Homer J. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Ms. Mackey's complaint sets out a kitchen-sink litany of causes of action with no factual
allegations supporting any of them. The reason for that is simple: there is no set of facts that would
allow her to prevail on any of the five causes of action she alleges. As such, her complaint should be
dismissed.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claims must be dismissed when,
taking all factual allegations as true, the plaintiff is still not entitled to relief. See St. Benedict's Dev.
Corp. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). Moreover, "the burden [is] with the
1

This memorandum is filed on behalf of Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc., and Cannon
Industries, Inc., the only entities that have been served in this matter. While the allegations of the Complaint are
accepted as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss, Mr. Cannon by no means concedes that he was acting for or
on behalf of any person or entity odier than himself when he spoke with a reporter from the Salt Lake Tribune.

plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to support [her] claim [ s , ] . . . " and the court is not "bound by
conclusory allegations, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions." Hackford v. Babbit 14 F.3d
1457,1465 (10th Cir. 1994)(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))(emphasis added). Under these plain
statements of prevailing Utah law, Ms. Mackey's complaint fails.
The Court will review the complaint in vain to find any factual allegations whatsoever that
could be deemed "sufficient to support [her] claim[s]." Instead, Ms. Mackey provides the Court with
nothing but a conclusory recitation of the legal elements of the causes of action she alleges.2 In
addition, the facts which are known to defendants, but which for some reason Ms. Mackey chose not to
allege, make it clear that she could not prevail on any of her causes of action as a matter of law.
While Ms. Mackey chose not to express the factual basis of her claims, the statements of her
counsel, Mr. Hoole, made to the news media, make it clear that all of her claims are based on a Salt
Lake Tribune newspaper article which ran on April 16,1998, in which Mr. Cannon was quoted as
having truthfully stated that "no cash or benefits were paid Mackey from congressional coffers,
personal monies or his business or campaign funds" in a settlement agreement entered
February 9,1998 between Ms. Mackey, Charles Warren and Cannon, and various Cannon entities. A
copy of this article is attached as Exhibit A.
The newspaper article further stated that Cannon believed his statements were allowed under
the confidentiality agreement entered at the time of the settlement, and that he "believed Mackey would
remain silent" with respect to the terms of the settlement, stating "There are a lot of reasons for her not
to speak to anybody about this . . . They are up to her — you can figure those out or ask her."
In a Tribune article which ran April 17, 1998, Mr. Hoole refers to that statement specifically
saying that

2

See e.g.. Complaint \ 11 ("Mr. Cannon intentionally induced the Employing Office, the Campaign and the
Cannon Entities to breach the contract with Ms. Mackey."); Complaint ^ 21 ("At times material hereto, Mr. Cannon
intentionally and with malice engaged in per se slanderous and libelous defamatory publications about Ms. Mackey
in an effort to impeach her honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation and thereby expose her to public hatred, contempt
or ridicule").
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it was that type of comment that spurred Thursday's lawsuit 'That suggests that she would
speak out if doing so would help her/ Hoole said. ' It assumes she has the legal ability to do
so, which is erroneous.' * That is the type of thing that is highly offensive to Ms. Mackey,'
Hoole said. He referred to a vague statement issued jointly by Cannon and Mackey when the
sexual harassment claims were settled. 'Any comment beyond that by any of the parties, I
believe, is inappropriate and actionable,' Hoole said. 'Particularly, the comments [Cannon]
made that essentially put Ms. Mackey in a position where she would have to respond publicly
or bear the pain of letting them stand in silence, unrebutted.'
Salt Lake Tribune, April 17,1998 (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B). Even accepting these
non-stated facts as true, Ms. Mackey's complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law.
I.

MS. MACKEY CANNOT CLAIM INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT.
The one factual allegation present in Ms. Mackey's complaint states: "At the time of Mr.

Cannon's acts which are complained of herein, Ms. Mackey was a party to a valid contract with the
Employing Office, the Campaign and the Cannon Entities [composed of Cannon Industries, Inc., The
CI Group, and Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc.]." Complaint \ 9. The contract to which she
obliquely refers is dated February 9,1998, and is titled "MUTUAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND FULL RELEASE." That agreement identifies the parties to it as follows:
This Settlement Agreement is made by and between Crelley Mackey ("Ms. Mackey"), and the
Office of Congressman Chris Cannon ("Employing Office"), Cannon Industries, Chris Cannon,
The CI Group, Cannon Industries, Inc., Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc., and any and all
other affiliated Cannon Entities (collectively the "Cannon Entities"), Chris Cannon for
Congress, Inc. (the "Campaign") and Charles R. Warren ("Mr. Warren").
Settlement Agreement, f 1. Thus, it is clear that, like Ms. Mackey, Mr. Cannon and entities of which
he is or was related, were parties to the contract referred to in Paragraph 9 of the complaint.3 That fact
alone disposes of Ms. Mackey's interference with a contract claim, because Utah law plainly provides
that one of the parties to a contract cannot be held liable for interference with it. Leigh Furniture and
Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982)('Tt is settled that one party to a contract cannot be
liable for the tort of interference with contract for inducing a breach by himself or the other contracting
3

Identification of the "Cannon Entities" was based on those named in charges Ms. Mackey filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Defendants herein do not concede the existence of all of the named parties.
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party.")- Thus, Mr. Cannon cannot be held liable for "intentionally interfering" with the Settlement
Agreement, and Ms. Mackey's claim for intentional interference with a contract must be dismissed.4
II.

MS. MACKEY'S INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Again, without stating any facts whatsoever, Ms. Mackey conclusorily alleges three of the four

invasion of privacy torts,5 namely (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts,
and (3) publicity which placed her in a "false light." Complaintffi[15-18. The complete lack of factual
reference mandates dismissal of each of these claims.
A.

Ms. Mackey has not alleged facts to meet the elements of a claim for intrusion
upon solitude or seclusion.

To establish a claim for the "intrusion upon seclusion" arm of the invasion of privacy torts, a
plaintiff must
prove two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was 'an intentional
substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of the complaining
party/ and (2) that the intrusion 'would be highly offensive to the reasonable person.'

4

To the extent that the Court could somehow find that Mr. Cannon was not a party to the Settlement
Agreement, the first cause of action would nonetheless still have to be dismissed because there are no factual
allegations in either the complaint or any of Mr. Hoole's statements regarding this case which would begin to
suggest how any entity acted in any fashion whatsoever that could be deemed a "breach of the contract with Ms.
Mackey." In particular, she does not set forth a single fact that would suggest that the "Employing Office, the
Campaign and the Cannon Entities" did anything at all that could be deemed a "breach [of] the contract
"
Complaint ^ 11. The first cause of action must be dismissed.
5

The Utah Court of Appeals discussed the development of the invasion of privacy torts as follows:
The current formulation of privacy law has been influenced to a large degree by Dean William L.
Prosser, who illuminated the law of privacy in a 1960 law review article. See William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 Cal. L.Rev. 383 (1960). Instead ofjust one tort, Dean Prosser wrote, the law of privacy
comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied
together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents
an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Id,
at 389 (footnote omitted). According to Dean Prosser, the four privacy torts are: (1) intrusion upon the
plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into plaintiffs private affairs, (2) appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness, (3) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff, and (4) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. See id. This
characterization of the privacy torts was later adopted by the Restatement, see Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§652A-652E (1977).

Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts. Inc.. 944 P.2d 374, 377-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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Stein, 944 P.2d at 378 (citation omitted). Ms. Mackey cannot meet either of these requirements.
The first element of this tort applies to literal invasions of one's privacy, for example invasion
of one's home, or the illegal search of one's shopping bag. Id. It could also include invasion by means
of surveillance equipment, such as by wiretapping or the use of microphones. Id. The one thing that is
clear, "however, [is] that there must be something in the nature of prying or intrusion, and that... bad
manners, harsh names, and insulting gestures in public, are not enough." Id. The court in Stein
specifically noted that "more is required than just an oblique reference, even to something as private as
sexual matters, to establish a claim of intrusion upon seclusion." Id.
Ms. Mackey has alleged no conduct that could remotely be said to satisfy this standard.
Moreover, the conduct that defendants believe prompted this lawsuit, Mr. Cannon's comments
recorded in the Tribune article, could not remotely be construed to satisfy this required element of the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion. As such, Ms. Mackey's claim for invasion of privacy fails.
It fails on the second prong of the intrusion upon seclusion tort as well, since no reasonable
person would be offended by Mr. Cannon's conduct. It is critical to note that "[ajlthough this
determination is usually within the province of the jury,... 'the trial court must make a threshold
determination of offensiveness in discerning the existence of a cause of action for intrusion.'" Id. at
379. The Stein court noted as follows:
In making its threshold determination of offensiveness, a court should consider such factors as
'the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as
well as the intruder's motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.'
Id. (citation omitted). This determination is impossible for the Court to make in this case because
there are no factual allegations to examine. However, even if the Court considers the allegations raised
by Mr. Hoole in the Tribune, it is obvious that no reasonable person would be offended by the alleged
"intrusion," which is that Mr. Cannon indicated, truthfully, that neither he nor any entity with which he
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is associated, paid any monies to Ms. Mackey in settlement of her sexual harassment charges. This
claim must therefore be dismissed.
B.

Ms, Mackev has not alleged facts to meet a claim for public disclosure of private
facts.

To establish a claim, for the "public disclosure of private facts" arm of the invasion of privacy
torts, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:
(1) the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure and not a private one; (2) the
facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and not public ones; and (3) the matter made
public must be one that would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities.
Id. at 380. The Utah court considering this tort recognized with approval an additional element which
the Restatement added to these requirements, which is that "the public must not have a legitimate
interest in having the information made available." Id. That element would be dispositive of Ms.
Mackey's "public disclosure" claim, even if her allegations were sufficient to state the claim.
Mr. Cannon told a Tribune reporter that no public funds were used in settlement of Ms.
Mackey's sexual harassment claims. Surely the public has an interest in that topic. Moreover, as noted
above, it is absolutely impossible to believe that a reasonable person would object to disclosure of that
true fact. This branch of the invasion of privacy claim must therefore be dismissed as well.
C.

Ms, Mackev has not alleged facts to state a claim for "false light'' invasion of
privacy.

The "false light" branch of invasion of privacy requires that the defendant
( 1 ) . . . give[] publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in
a false lightf; (2)] the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person[;] and [(3)] the actor ha[d] knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
Id. at 380 (citation omitted). Ms. Mackey's claim in this regard again fails for lack of any allegation to
suggest that Mr. Cannon ever, in any way, placed her before the public in a false light. He stated that
neither he nor any of his entities paid Ms. Mackey to settle her sexual harassment claims. For some
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reason, she apparently finds that fact offensive, but it is, unquestionably true. Thus, Ms. Mackey
cannot remotely demonstrate that the truth places her in a false light. For all of these reasons, Ms.
Mackey's claim for invasion of privacy must be dismissed.
HI.

MS. MACKEY'S DEFAMATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PLEAD
WITH THE REQUISITE PARTICULARITY.
Ms. Mackey's defamation claim fails because it has not been plead with any degree of

specificity. She merely alleges as follows:
At times material hereto, Mr. Cannon intentionally and with malice engaged mper se
slanderous and libelous defamatory publications about Ms. Mackey in an effort to impeach her
honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation and thereby expose her to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule.
Complaint f 21. The Utah Supreme Court has soundly rejected such unspecified allegations.
In Dennett v. Smith. 21 Utah 2d 368,445 P.2d 983 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court dismissed
a complaint which, like in the present case "simple averred that 'defendant made, declared and
published to certain persons certain derogatory and libelous statements relating and pertaining to the
plaintiff which tended to degrade and discredit him." Id. At 984. The Court, in a three paragraph
opinion, disposed of the complaint, stating:
We believe and hold that such allegation does not accord with the letter and spirit of rule 8,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, common law rules of pleading, or the most liberal of any other
rules of pleading.
It is almost axiomatic that in defamation cases a certain degree of specificity is an essential in
pleadings, that the language complained of must be set forth in words or words to that effect
and that the defendant should not be required to resort to the ofttimes expensive discovery
process to drag from a litigant what he really intends to do to his adversary by a vehicle
shrouded in mystery.
Id, In a Utah district court decision, the court likewise held that to "meet the particularity
requirements with which a defamation claim must be alleged[,] Utah law requires that a claim must
identify the defamatory statement either by its 'words or words to that effect/ general conclusory
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statements are inadequate." Boisiolv v. Morton ThiokoL Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 799-800 (D. Utah
1988). In that case, the court also stated:
Although there is no Utah law directly on point, courts have generally required the
complaint to also allege when, where, and to whom the alleged defamatory statement was
made
The purpose of the particularity requirement in pleading defamation is to allow the
court to decide if the statement is defamatory and to allow the defendant to formulate a defense.
Id. at 800 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). Ms. Mackey's allegations meet none of these standards.
Her defamation claim must be dismissed.
IV.

MS. MACKEY'S INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM FAILS
BECAUSE NO OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT HAS BEEN ALLEGED.
As a matter of law, the mere mention of the words "outrageous and intolerable" and "infliction

of severe emotional distress11 cannot suffice to state a claim for that tort. At a bare minimum, the
complaint must allege facts that could conceivably satisfy the elements of an emotional distress claim.
In this case, no such facts are alleged.
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will lie:
where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would
have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.
Dubois v. Grand Central 872 P.2d 1073,1078 (Utah Ct. App. 1994V quoting Samms v. Eccles, 358
P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1961)(emphasis added). Ms. Mackey makes no allegations that could be
construed to satisfy these criteria, which demonstrates that any claim for damages based on emotional
distress is baseless.
Ms. Mackey alleges that Mr. Cannon "intended to cause or acted in reckless disregard of the
likelihood of causing Ms. Mackey emotional distress[, and his] conduct... was outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality."
Complaintffi[24, 25. The complaint then alleges "As a result, Ms. Mackey has suffered severe
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emotional distress." Complaint ^ 26. These conclusions, however, are unsupported by any factual
allegations; thus, they fail to state a cause of action. Ms. Mackey makes no allegations that could
remotely be construed to satisfy the elements of an emotional distress claim, particularly that of
"outrageous and intolerable" conduct.
Liability may be found only in those cases where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree as to go beyond the bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.
Roberts v. Savior, 637 P.2d 1175,1179 (Kan. 1981) (emphasis added); Patton v. J.C. Pennev Co., 719
P.2d 854, 859 (Or. 1986)(employerfs actions which were "rude, boorish, tyrannical, churlish and
mean," nonetheless did not support claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Because of
the complete absence of any allegations that could remotely be construed as "outrageous and
intolerable" conduct, Ms. Mackey's fourth cause of action for infliction of emotional distress must be
dismissed.
V.

MS. MACKEY HAS NOT ALLEGED ANY CONDUCT WHICH COULD BE
CONSTRUED AS A BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND THE CONDUCT
COMPLAINED OF BY MR. HOOLE IN THE TRIBUNE IS AT MOST A
NON-MATERIAL BREACH OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
Ms. Mackey's alleges that "On or about April 15,1998, Chris Cannon, acting on behalf of the

Employing Office, the Campaign and the Cannon Entities, breached the [February 9,1998 Settlement
Agreement] by disclosing confidential information regarding the same." Complaint f 30. As noted
above, this could only have reference to the disclosures reported by the Tribune on February 16,1998.
As further noted above, however, the only comments Mr. Cannon made with respect to the Settlement
Agreement were that neither he nor any of his associated entities paid Ms. Mackey in settlement of her
previous claims. That disclosure was allowed by the terms of the Settlement Agreement, which
provides as follows:
The Parties agree that the factual and legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes
arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement shalLbe confidential and that they shall
ndt disclose to any third party that confidential information* the terms of settlemenror the
9
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amount of the payments made under the Settlement Agreement, except (a) to their attorneys,
therapists, tax advisors or their ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by law;.. .(c) to disclose
on Monday, February 9,1998 that "Ms. Mackey's claims against the Employing Office, the
Cannon Entities, the Campaign and Mr. Warren have been resolved to the Parties' satisfaction;
(d) thereafter, if pressured by the media, to disclose (after first having spoken with Roger
H. Hoole), that "Ms. Mackey's claims against the Employing Office, the Cannon Entities,
the Campaign and Mr. Warren have been resolved to the Parties satisfaction by
settlement without any admission of liability, or payment of monies from Chris Cannon
or the use of tax dollars, and that Ms. Mackey has voluntarily resigned her position as
Field Coordinator in the Provo Office of Chris Cannon in order to accept employment
with the Utah Legislature effective February 1,1998"; and (e) thereafter, if further
pressured by the media and asked specifically whether Cannon entities or individuals
contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his representative may respond
(after first having spoken with Roger H. Hoole) that "no Cannon entities or campaign
contributed to any settlement" Other than as specifically allowed herein, the Parties and
their attorneys shall not volunteer any confidential information, and in response to any
request for information by any person or entity shall say only "no comment."
Settlement Agreement at f 6. According to these terms, Mr. Cannon provided the information allowed
therein. His only "breach" is that he failed to first speak with Mr. Hoole. Such breach, however, is
immaterial at best. Of course, all of this is based on Mr. Cannon inferring the conduct which Ms.
Mackey appears to believe constitutes a breach. In any event, this cause of action should be dismissed.
VI.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE FORECLOSED BY THE PLAIN TERMS OF THE
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT,
Ms. Mackey's allegations of a right to recover punitive damages in this case are precluded by

the terms of the Settlement Agreement itself. Therein, the Parties specifically agreed as follows:
The Parties agree that if any of the them [sic] breach the confidentiality provisions contained in
paragraph 6 above, other than as contemplated by this Settlement Agreement, the breaching
party will pay liquidated damages in the total amount of $10,000.00 to the non-breaching
parties.
Settlement Agreement at ^ 7 (emphasis added). If Mr. Cannon's conduct constitutes anything at all, it
is an immaterial breach of the confidentiality provisions of the Settlement Agreement. However, even
if the Court were to determine that the alleged breach was material, damages would be limited to a total
amount of $10,000.00 to the non-breaching parties.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ms. Mackey's complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Defendants therefore request that the Court dismiss the Complaint
in its entirety.
DATED this 7th day of May, 1998.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Mary Anne Q. Vfoof.
Sheri A. Mower
Attorneys for Defendants
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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BENCH, Judge:
ill Appellant, Crelley Mackey (Mackey) r asserts that the trial
court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss her amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted- See Utah R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6). Mackey argues that postsettlement statements Chris Cannon (Cannon) personally made to
reporters for the Salt Lake Tribune breached the parties'
settlement agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Cannon argues that the statements did not violate
the agreement because, as a matter of law, they were not
prohibited disclosures of confidential information- We reverse
and remand.
BACKGROUND
%2 Because this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, "we accept the factual allegations in

the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from
those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff!] ." Cruz v,
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. , 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah
1996) . In any event, the material facts in this matter are not
disputed.
H3
In 1997, Mackey, a former field worker for Cannon's
congressional office, brought allegations of sexual harassment
against Cannon and various entities with which he was associated.
The allegations arose out of Mackey 1 s unspecified physical
relationship with Cannon's chief of staff, Charles R. Warren.
There were no allegations that Cannon personally harassed Mackey;
he was named in the complaint only "because of his duty to
oversee "his office and employees,"
14
In February 1998, the parties entered into a written
settlement agreement (the Agreement) resolving any factual and
legal allegations relating to claims and disputes between them.
The Agreement contains the following confidentiality provision;
The parties agree that the f a c t u ^ and legal
allegations relating to JEheir.claims and
disputes arising prior to the date of this
Settlement Agreement shall be confidential
and that they shall not disclose to any third
party that confidential information, the
terms of the settlement or the amount of the
payments made under the Settlement Agreement,
except - . . (c) to disclose on Monday,
February 9, 1998 that "Ms. Mackey 1 s claims
, , . have been resolved to the Parties !
satisfaction"; (d) thereafter, if pressured
by the media, to disclose (after first having
spoken with Roger H. Hoole), that "Ms,
Mackey 1 s claims . . . have been resolved to
the Parties' satisfaction by settlement
without any admission of liability, or
payment of monies from Chris Cannon or the .
use of tax dollars, and that Ms. Mackey has
voluntarily resigned her position as Field
Coordinator in the Provo Office of Chris
Cannon in order to accept employment with the
Utah Legislature effective February 1, 199S";
and (e) thereafter, if further pressured by
the media and asked specifically whether the
Cannon Entities or individuals contributed
money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his
representatives may respond (after having
spoken,.wi.Mi Wnapr H. Hoole) that "no Cannon
entities or campaign contributed to any
"ther than aB specifically

990123^

allowed herein, the Parties and their
attorneys shall not volunteer anv
confidential information, and in response to
anv request for information bv anv person or
entity shall say only "no comment.*
(Emphasis added.) In sum, the confidentiality provision of the
Agreement provides that the factual and legal allegations, the
terms of the settlement, and the amount paid thereunder, shall be
confidential. It also provides that, subject to the very
narrowly defined exceptions, confidential information shall not
be disclosed to third parties, and that any further requests for
information shall be met with a M no comment" response.
H5
Exceptions (a) and (b) do not relate to this appeal nor to
the underlying action. Statements in conformity with exception
(c) were released to the media on February 9, 1998, and were
reported in local newspapers on February 10 and 11, 1998, As the
result of media pressure, statements in conformity with exception
(d) were released to the media and reported in at least one
newspaper on February 11, 1998, This leaves only exception (e)
and the "no comment" requirement for consideration in this
appeal.
^6
Mackey's amended complaint alleges that on April 15, 1998,
Cannon and certain members of his congressional staff met with
three reporters at the Salt Lake Tribune, and that Cannon "made a
number of voluntary statements and expressed certain opinions,
which statements and opinions comprise 'factual and legal
allegations relating to [the parties 1 ] claims and disputes, ,n in
violation of the uexpress prohibition of the settlement agreement
against a party's post-settlement disclosure of mooted factual
and legal allegations." The amended complaint asserts that
Cannon made the following prohibited statements:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

990123-CA

That [Mackey] has the ability to waive
conf identiality,that they are not holding her to
confidentiality;
that although she is free to disctiss it,
there would be no benefit for her to
talk about it publicly;
that there was no impropriety on Mr.
Cannon' s part ,that no hostile environment existed in
Mr. Cannon's office;
that there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's
allegations ,that Ms. Mackey ! B allegations had no
merit; and

3

(8)

that her allegations wouldn't have held
up.

Some of the above statements appeared the following day in a
Tribune article entitled "Cannon Talks on Sex Case,*1 The article
provides, in relevant part:
"No entity associated with me paid a
nickle," Cannon said Wednesday. "There was
no impropriety on my part and no hostile
environment. Nothing came home to roost."
Cannon previously had declined to discuss
details of the settlement in February with
his former field coordinator Crelley Mackey.
He made the comments Wednesday as an
apparent attempt at political selfinoculation in light of expected scrutiny "[in
connection with his role in deciding] whether
to initiate impeachment proceedings against
President Clinton.

Cannon said he did not consider Mackey
bound by confidentiality.
"We're willing to give her latitude to
express whatever she wants about this,1' said
the congressman. "We don't want her
maligning me personally. But she has the
ability to waive confidentiality on this.
There's nothing I'm holding her to
confidentiality on."
However, Cannon said he believed Mackey
would remain silent.
"There are a lot of reasons for her not
to speak with anybody about this," Cannon
said- "They are up to
her--you can figure
those out or ask her,11
Mackey1 s attorney, Roger Hoole, declined
comment Wednesday,
Dan Harrie, Cannon Talks on Sex Cage. Salt Lake Tribune, April
16, 1998, at B-l.
^7
After the meeting on April 15 f 1998--and before publishing
the article the next day--the Tribune reporter called Mackey1s
attorney, Mr. Hoole, The reporter informed Hoole that Cannon
volunteered the above statements, and then asked if Hoole had any
response to the statements. Hoole said, "All I can say is that
the matter was resolved to the parties' satisfactipn."
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Mackey brought the underlying action on April 16, 1998--the
very day the article appeared in the Tribune. Cannon moved to
dismiss the action under Rule 12(b) (6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. After a hearing, the trial court granted Cannon's
motion. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that none
of the eight statements breached the confidentiality provision of
the Agreement, In reaching its conclusion, the trial court went
behind the bare allegations of the amended complaint and
considered each of the eight statements, comparing them to the
language of the confidentiality provision of the Agreement. This
appeal followed.
STANDARD OP REVIEW
19

When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on
Rule 12(b) (6), an appellate court must accept
the material allegations of the complaint as
true, and the trial court's ruling should be
affirmed only if it clearly appears the
complainant can prove no set of facts in
support of his or her claims-

Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, £ n c 841 P. 2d 742, 744 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992} ,
"A dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is
not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd,.
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). Additionally, we "must consider
all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Anderson, 841 P.2d at
744, "The propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny
a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b) (6) is a question of law that
we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253.
ANALYSIS
HlO The factual basis of Mackey 1 s complaint is not contested.
In fact/ Cannon does not dispute the material factual allegations
of Mackey 1 s complaint, whioh are as follows: (1) the parties
entered into the Agreement on February 9, 199B; (2) the Agreement
contains a confidentiality provision; (3) Cannon and certain
members of his congressional staff met with Tribune reporters on
April 15, 1998? (4) Cannon made the eight statements outlined
above; and (5) some of these statements appeared in a Tribune
article the following day.
^11 In short, the dispute involves whether the statements Cannon
voluntarily made to the Tribune violate the confidentiality
provision, thereby breaching the Agreement. Mackey asserts that
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these statements constitute "factual and legal allegations," the
disclosure of which violates the confidentiality provision.
Cannon argues that the statements were: (1) permissible under
the exceptions in the confidentiality clause; (2) already made
public, and thus cannot be deemed confidential; or (3) merely
"generic statements," "conclusory statements," or "opinion."
fl2 The material factual allegations in this case, particularly
the existence and nature of the comments made, are undisputed by
Cannon. Construing the facts and all inferences therefrom in
Mackey1s favor, as we must do, it is conceivable that Mackey,
upon being allowed the opportunity to develop and prove her case,
can demonstrate that the statements violate the confidentiality
provision of the Agreement. "The courts are a forum for settling
controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim
should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue
should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to
present its proof." Colman, 795 P.2d at 624. On the facte
alleged, Mackey must be given "an opportunity to present [her]
proof." Id.
Hl3 A motion to dismiss is properly granted only in cases in
which, even if the "factual assertions in the complaint were
correct, they provided no legal basis for recovery." Lowe v.
Sorenson Research_Co. . Inc. , 779 P,2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989) . In
other words, dismissal in this case would have been appropriate
if Mackey had, for example, not alleged sufficient facts to meet
all the elements of a breach of contract claim- Mackey, however,
alleged facts concerning each element of the claim of breach of
contract, i.e., existence of a contract, performance by har,
nonperformance by Cannon, and
damages. Hence, the trial court
erred in dismissing Mackey1s case because she alleged sufficient
facts to survive a motion to dismiss.
1l4 Moreover, some of the eight statements are arguably "factual
and legal allegations relating to [the parties1] claims."
Cannon's assertion that his statements are simply "generic" or
"opinion" does not insulate him from the confidentiality
provision of the Agreement. Cannon's narrow reading of the
confidentiality provision would vitiate the Agreement and allow
him to maks virtually any statement he wanted, so long as he
called it "opinion," or so long as he believed the comment was
sufficiently "generic" or was simply a "conclusory statement.11
The confidentiality provision itself makes no allowance for
opinion or generalized statements concerning the matter. The
confidentiality provision was obviously intended to put the
entire dispute to rest. Mackey has therefore sufficiently
pleaded her claims, and she is entitled to her day in court.
HX5 Finally, Cannon argues that some or all the statements are
mere repetitions of statements already made public, and thus
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cannot be considered "confidential." Previous press coverage or
other prior disclosure of some information may actually be
irrelevant in this case because the Agreement makes no exception
for continued disclosure or discussion of matters previously
disclosed. In any event, whether the statements are mere
repetitions of material already made public presents a factual
question not appropriately resolved in a motion to dismiss.1
CONCLUSION
Hi6 Under the factual allegations of this case, which are
undisputed by Cannon, Mackey has stated claims for breach of
contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
She is therefore entitled to proceed with her case%ll Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of the
motion to dismiss and remand the case for further proceedings.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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WE CONCUR:
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Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

udith ML Billingsf Judge

1. Neither of Mackey1s causes of action are typically resolved
as a matter of law. See, e.g. , Cook v. Zions First Nat' 1 Bank,
919 P-2d 56, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating "whether there hae
been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue,
generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law");
Olvmous Hills Ctr. , Ltd. jy. Smith's Food, 389 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) ("Whether a party has materially breached a
[contract] is generally a question of fact for the fact
finder.•").
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communication is subject to internal censure or discipline
through the same procedures that the Board utilizes to
address and resolve ethical issues.

THE
CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY A C T

OF

1995

PROCEDURAL RULES

§9.05 Informal Resolutions and Settlement
Agreements.
(a) Informal Resolution. At any time before a covered
employee who has filed a formal request for counseling files a
complaint under section 405, a covered employee and the
employing office, on their own, may agree voluntarily and
informally to resolve a dispute, so long as the resolution
does not require a waiver of a covered employee's rights or
the commitment by the employing office to an enforceable
obligation.
(b) Formal Settlement Agreement. The parties may agree
formally to settle all or part of a disputed matter in accordance with section 414 of the Act. In that event, the agreement shall be in writing and submitted to the Executive
Director for review and approval.
§9.06 Revocation, Amendment or Waiver of Rules.
(a) The Executive Director, subject to the approval of the
Board, may revoke or amend these rules by publishing proposed changes in the Congressional Record and providing for
a comment period of not less than 30 days. Following the
comment period, any changes to the rules are final once they
are published in the Congressional Record.
(b) The Board or a Hearing Officer may waive a procedural
rule contained in this Part in an individual case for good
cause shown if application of the rule is not required by law.
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